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Abstract. China’s monetary policy has evolved from obscurity into spotlight due to its 
torrid economic expansion in recent times, as well as its exchange rate regime that has been 
under constant scrutiny of its trading partners. While China’s economy is centrally-planned, 
it is veering more towards a market-based system with goals of stability and growth. With 
this in mind, this paper is an introspection of China’s monetary policy since the 
establishment of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) to the present. Additionally, this paper 
surveys empirical literature on the effectiveness of policy tools undertaken by the PBC. 
Recommendations are made to Chinese monetary authority on how to navigate the 
turbulent waves of economic fluctuations with a managed exchange rate, within its borders 
and beyond.  
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1. Introduction 
hina’s monetary policy has evolved from obscurity into spotlight due to its 
torrid economic expansion in recent times, as well as its exchange rate 
regime that has been under constant scrutiny from its trading partners. 
While China’s economy is centrally-planned, it is veering more towards a market-
based system with goals of stability and growth. It is important to trace the 
beginnings of China’s modern monetary policy in order to understand how the 
country manages its growing economy. This is because the core of modern market-
based economy is the role of the central bank linking the real economy to the 
practice of monetary policy to affect aggregate demand and economic growth. 
Given China’s exchange rate inflexibility and capital restrictions, monetary policy 
effectiveness can be limiting. However, in October 2016, as the Chinese currency 
renminbi became one of the five currencies that makes up the special drawing 
rights (SDR) of the IMF, the country would need to further loosen controls on its 
currency. 
There is a dearth of literature on the modern monetary history of China. This 
paper is the first to trace the origin of China’s foray into modern monetary policy, 
and follows its development from a closed, command-economy to a more open and 
market-based system. Moreover, in order for monetary policy to be more effective 
in achieving macroeconomic goals, a set of recommendations is proposed for 
China’s monetary authority to consider.  
With this in mind, this paper is an introspection of China’s monetary policy 
since the establishment of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) on December 1, 1948 
to the present. Additionally, this paper surveys empirical literature on how 
effective the policy tools are to navigate the turbulent waves of economic 
fluctuations, with a fixed exchange rate, within its borders and beyond. This allows 
for further understanding of the PBC’s actions, and for market participants to 
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anticipate and manage risks associated with China’s monetary policy, financial 
markets, and economy in the future. 
Recommendations to the PBC going forward are for it to implement further 
financial reforms towards a more market-oriented system, at a moderate and 
managed pace so as not to have too much disruptions to its financial markets. For 
instance, by expanding its capital markets to more participants, including foreign 
entities; increasing exchange rate flexibility and the convertibility of its currency.  
On the monetary policy front, instead of placing its primary focus on high 
growth rate, it should also keep track of the stability of inflation and unemployment 
issues, as its growth rate slows down to a more moderate pace. In the longer term 
perspective, as its annual growth rate slows down to a more sustainable and 
moderate pace, its monetary policy should have a Taylor Rule in place to adjust its 
nominal interest rate instead of having an unstable, discretionary monetary policy 
regime. This can pave way for a more independent central bank, and monetary 
policy that does not rely on a specific regime. However, this cannot be 
accomplished without further liberalization of interest rates and financial markets. 
Since China’s development of central banking system is nascent, the scope of 
this paper is first to outline the history behind the development of monetary policy 
after Communist rule in Section One. Section Two reviews the tools that the PBC 
utilizes for monetary policy. Section Three chronicles the development of money 
markets in China. Section Four discusses China’s managed exchange rate system. 
Section Five is an empirical literature survey of the effectiveness of China’s 
monetary policy in recent times.  Section Six completes this paper with concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. The four phases of monetary development 
The development of China’s monetary policy can be separated into four distinct 
phases. The first phase lasted for almost forty years prior to China’s extraordinary 
economic growth in recent times. 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) is the central bank of China, with the 
authority to control monetary policy and regulate financial institutions in China. It 
was established on December 1, 1948 through the merger of Huabei Bank, the 
Beihai Bank and the Xibei Farmer Bank. From 1949 to 1984, it was the only bank 
in mainland China, and thus was given the dual function as a central bank and 
commercial banking operations during that time period.  It wasn’t until the late 
1970s when China opened its economy that it decided to revamp its monetary 
structure. 
During 1949 – 84, not only was PBC the country’s central bank, but it was also 
the sole commercial bank.  Moreover, its main responsibility was to be the 
accounting agent for the government by acting as an intermediary between the 
Ministry of Finance, which collected taxes, and the State Planning Commission, 
which allocated spending of those tax revenues collected. Basically, it took 
deposits from the Ministry of Finance and distributed the funds based on the 
directive of the State Planning Commission. 
The second period of development started in 1984, when a series of bank 
reforms were implemented. The purpose of these reforms was aimed to 
decentralize the monopolistic banking system at the time, so as to enable the 
banking system to become more competitive and profit- oriented, in tune with the 
economy that was also starting to experiment with more market-based approach.  
While it was expected that the PBC was to assist in the transformation of China’s 
nascent growing economy, its authority and efforts were often sidestepped by the 
local government due to difference in goals of the local authorities and the PBC. In 
this second period of development, PBC was officially renamed as the central bank 
of China, but its policies at that time was not specific in setting monetary targets, 
since the central government at the time set fiscal and monetary policies. 
In 1986, the PBC started to provide more traditional bank loans in the market 
place.  This foray into private banking was to keep pace with the opening of the 
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Chinese economy and its transition into a more market-based approach. The PBC’s 
lending policy was driven by the government’s overall macroeconomic plans for 
the country, and thus the PBC acted in accordance with the Chinese government’s 
political goals and objectives.  Due to the multiple roles of the PBC as a national 
bank, government entity, and local bank branches, conflicts started to surface, 
especially since the local branches of the PBC were actually controlled by the local 
governments, while the central bank was controlled by the national government. 
Although the local branches of the PBC had the authority to allocate credit, the 
local governments had strong influences over these branches, since the branches 
were also part of the local government. As a result of this structure, local 
governments could appoint top personnel running these local PBC branches, and 
exerted a great deal of influence over the policies of these local branches. Local 
government placed their own regional economic interest over national interest, and 
pressured the local PBC branches to expand money supply beyond control.  Ikeya 
(2002) points out that the result was increase instability from high inflation that 
decreased people’s purchasing power, and the subsequent radical credit tightening 
by the government exacerbated financial turmoil, a possible source of provocation 
leading to the Tiananmen incident. Furthermore, the increasing investment, 
particularly from foreign sources, fueled double-digit inflation (Figure 1 1  and 
Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. China’s Annual Inflation RateSince 1994 (Percentage Change in CPI from 
December to December) [Retrieved from]. 
 
 
Figure 2. China’s GDP Deflator – Annual Percentage2 
 
The year 1993 marked the beginning of the third development phase, as the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee proclaimed for the first time that the 
ultimate target of monetary policy was to maintain currency stability through the 
management of the country’smoney supply, and bestowed upon the central bank 
 
1 CPI date prior to 1994 is not available. 
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the authority to make and implement monetary policy. Its main roles were to 
support economic growth and maintain the value of currency. Thereafter, a series 
of major reforms included the announcement of the money supply system in1994, 
the removal of upper limits on interbank lending rates, and the specification of M2 
as the intermediary monetary target in 1996. According to several sources, 
including Yu (1997), Laurens & Maino (2007), and Porter & Xu (2009), the effort 
to control M2 is a better predictor of future price movements than the original bank 
credit system.  These changes were modeled after the U.S Federal Reserve System, 
as well as to strengthen the central government’s control by eliminating local 
government influence over the local branches. While similar to the Federal Reserve 
in that the PBC also issues notes, serving as a bank for other banks, and the bank of 
the central government, it also provides management directives to the local banks 
so that the local banks comply with the macroeconomic objectives of the central 
government.  As a result of this guidance, the PBC is able to control credit creation 
by banks in China, limit foreign investment, and control the size of the capital 
market. 
In 1998, a major restructuring with the PBC abolished all provincial and local 
branches, and instead the central bank opened nine regional branches, whose 
boundaries did not correspond to local administrative boundaries.  This marked the 
beginning of the fourth phase of development. Additionally, the State Council 
proclaimed its policy to maintain the stability of its exchange rate in order to 
promote economic growth in 1998 (Laurens & Maino 2007). Together with this 
major restructuring is a need for money markets in order to facilitate the 
implementation of monetary policy, since open market operations is the primary 
policy tool for central banks in developed economies. In China, the practice of 
actively implementing monetary policy to influence the real economy began in 
1998. Since monetary policy cannot be properly implemented with money markets, 
Section Three of this paper chronicles the formation and development of China’s 
money markets. 
In 2003, the Chinese Congress passed an amendment law to strengthen the role 
of PBC as the monetary authority. That allowed it further influence in making and 
implementing monetary policy to safeguard the overall financial stability, and to 
provide financial services to anexpanding economy.  As such, monetary policy in 
communist China is a recent concern, and close scrutiny of the PBC’s actions did 
not start until the 1990’s.  Particular of interest to China’s trading partners globally 
is the fixed-exchange rate regime undertaken by the Chinese government, and most 
academic studies of Chinese monetary policy placed primary focus on its exchange 
rate policy. 
 
3. Monetary policy instruments in China 
The People’s Bank of China Act, which was promulgated in 1995, established 
the main objectives of monetary policy as to “maintain the stability of the value of 
the currency and thereby promote economic growth” [Retrieved from]. While price 
stability is important, economic growth is also of great importance, as the Chinese 
government sets a target growth rate each year as a guideline for the 
implementation of monetary policy by the PBC. Consistent with this mandate, the 
PBC actively keeps the renminbi within a floating range via foreign exchange 
interventions. With these primary objectives of price and exchange rate stability, 
together with consistent high growth, the PBC utilizes several monetary policy 
instruments to achieve these goals; this is unlike advance economies’ use of target 
interest rate as the main monetary tool. 
Monetary policy instruments utilized by PBC include required reserve ratio, 
central bank base interest rate, rediscounting, central bank lending, open market 
operations and other policy instruments specified by the State Council [Retrieved 
from]. 
While most developed economies use interest rate adjustments as the primary 
tool of monetary policy, China’s monetary policy encompasses more instruments 
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than others.  Unlike the Federal Reserve’s target of the Fed Funds rate as a primary 
monetary tool, China lacks a clear policy to target a specific interest rate. Yao, Luo, 
& Loh (2011) point out that aside from interest rate, the PBC also utilizes money 
supply, specifically M2 as an intermediate target, and bank reserve ratio as a way 
to meet its monetary goals of price stability and promote economic growth.  China 
needs more than interest rate adjustment as a monetary tool since the impact of a 
change in interest rate on the economy is not as effective as it would have been in 
other economies due to various reasons. 
A consensus was established among literature regarding China’s lack of 
liberalization of its interest rate system, including Laurens & Maino (2007), Geiger 
(2008), and Porter & Xu (2009). Bank deposits and lending rates are mostly 
dictated by the PBC, and while some liberalization had occurred, for instance, in 
2004, PBC removed the lending rate ceiling, but stillkept the lending rate floor and 
deposit rate.  Moreover, the banking industry remains dominated by large, state-
owned banks.  According to Dickinson & Liu (2007), these large state-owned 
institutions enjoyed monopoly power and absorbed over 60 percent of bank loans, 
thus they netted a significant amount of irregular profits that were not sensitive to 
interest rate changes. Wan & Zhang (2002) show that base rate adjustments may 
not be effectively transmitted to certain market sectors due to the lack of 
competition and prevalent liquidity constraints. Xie & Yuan (2003) find that bank 
lending, mainly from state-owned enterprises, continues to be the main funding 
source for Chinese enterprises, despite the establishment of corporate bond and 
stock markets in the early 1990’s. These financial markets were heavily controlled 
by the government and are still not mature enough as a source of raising funds for 
Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Yue & Zhou (2007) point out that the 
consumption behavior of Chinese consumers is not sensitive to changes in interest 
rate. Chinese households have a high saving rate, and do not fund their spending 
with credit.  As a result, changes in interest rate do not alter their spending habits, 
thus reducing the effectiveness of interest rate as a policy instrument for PBC. 
 
4. Development of money market in China 
The major restructure with the PBC in 1998 with the intent of replicating a 
modern, more developed central-banking system led to the need for adjusting 
central bank balance sheet to implement effective monetary policy. As such, 
October 1998 marked the beginning of open market operations for PBC, when it 
started cash trading of bonds. Its public debt to GDP ratio has been steadily 
increasing since 1984, and as of 2015, stand at 42.92% [Retrieved from] (Figure 3). 
China’s interbank markets comprises of several sub-markets described in this 
section. 
 
 
Figure 3. 
Percentage of China’s Public Debt to GDP [Retrieved from]. 
 
4.1. Interbank market 
Reforms on interest rates and the interbank market started in 1996, where the 
PBC combined the segmented market into a national platform, where all members 
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of this market must trade via an electronic trading system. Rules on member 
qualifications, as well as trading terms, have been specified so as to have a unified 
national system. Starting in 1996, the PBC lifted the upper limits on interbank 
lending rates, financial institutions were given the ability to set their own rate for 
interbank lending and borrowing. Additionally, the interbank offered rates 
(CHIBOR) are published on a regularly basis (Duo, 2002). Thereafter, a series of 
interest rates liberalization materialized, including the rates on financial bonds by 
policy banks and Treasury bonds in 1998, corporate bonds in 2005, and corporate 
notes in 2008 (Porter & Xu 2009). 
Porter and Xu (2009) formulate an empirical model of China’s 7-day and show 
that regulated rates in China do have an influence on interbank rates, thus assets 
valued via interbank rates do not reflect true market conditions. The authors 
conclude that additional liberalization of deposit and lending rates would enable 
the interbank rate to serve the role of independent benchmark and monetary policy 
implementation.  
 
4.2. Repo market 
The repo market is considered the largest, most liquid money market instrument 
in China. Chinese repo markets follow standardized policies and procedures of the 
more developed financial markets, offering two types of repo: interbank and stock 
exchange. Of the two types, stock exchange repo offers quasi-sovereignty 
counterparty risk and timelier settlement than interbank repo. Compared to 
interbank repo, stock exchange repo in China is more market-driven and being 
monitored in real-time, thus is considered the most accurate indicator of liquidity 
and the cost of credit. 
The PBC conducts open market operations for liquidity and financial stability 
through the interbank repo market, and the central bank decides on the yield of its 
repo trades. As such, interbank repo yields are generally more stable than stock 
exchange repo yields, and also provide market participants indications as to what 
the central bank feels about market and economic conditions. 
 
4.3. Bond Markets 
In recent year, due to the slowing of China’s economy, significant cash has been 
flowing out of the country. It is estimated that individuals and companies have 
moved approximately $1 trillion out of the country over the past year and a half 
[Rterieved from]. 
To offset this exodus of money out of the country, and ease the downward 
pressure on the renminbi, the PBC announced on February 24, 2016 to lift quotas 
on foreign investments in its interbank bond market. Eligible foreign financial 
institutions that are included are commercial lenders, insurance companies, 
securities firms and asset managers [Retrieved from]. This effort to stop money 
flowing out of the country was urgent, since the PBC used up almost $300 billion 
in its foreign exchange reserves to support its currency in the prior few months 
[Retrieved from]. It is too early to speculate the consequences of this relaxed 
foreign capital restrictions, as bad assets start to accumulate in the interbank 
markets as banks and nonbank financial institutions take on investments seeking 
higher returns with increased risks. 
 
5. Chinese monetary policy and the exchange rate 
The Chinese government defends its fixed exchange rate regime as the need for 
stability of its economy.  The Chinese monetary authority has emphasized its 
macroeconomic goals of price stability, growth, full employment and balanced 
balance of payment account, particularly through a managed floating exchange rate 
regime. However, its exchange rate has been under heavy control and despite 
international pressures to let the renminbi adjust to supply and demand, the 
Chinese currency remains fairly fixed against the U.S. dollar. 
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While the nominal rate of renminbi is fixed against the U.S. dollar, its 
movements against other major currencies are anything but stable. Given the 
unpredictability of the dollar against major currencies as the euro and the Japanese 
yen, if the dollar appreciates against the yen, so does the renminbi. Furthermore, as 
points out by Lardy (2005), the Chinese government has made numerous major 
adjustments in its exchange rate since 1978, when it began economic reform. 
In January 1981, the authorities devalued the renminbi by 50 percent in trade 
transactions by introducing an internal settlement rate of 2.8 renminbi to the dollar 
while the official rate remained at 1.5. From this period until the end of 1984, the 
authorities gradually depreciated the official rate until it reached 2.8, and ended the 
internal settlement rate. The official rate continued to depreciate, and hit 3.2 by 
mid-1986. On July 5, 1986, the authorities, in a single stroke, devalued the 
currency to 3.7 versus the U.S. dollar, a whopping 15 percent decrease. In1989, the 
authorities again devalued the currency significantly in one step, this time by 21.2 
percent. Thereafter, the authorities allowed exporters to retain a share of their 
foreign exchange earnings, and transactions in the secondary market continued to 
expand as a result. 
In January 1994, the government unified the two rates at 8.7, and the currency 
began to appreciate gradually until it reached a value of 8.28 by mid-1995, and the 
nominal rate has remained fixed at that level. The fixed exchange rate regime as a 
requirement for economic stability expressed by the monetary authority has little 
basis, since the nominal rate has been adjusted repeatedly, sometimes by 
significant amounts over the years since economic reform began. 
Additionally, the real trade-weighted exchange rate has not been stable due to 
the huge trade surplus of the Chinese economy against its trading partners. In 
recent years, the Chinese government has begun to appreciate its currency against 
the U.S. dollar due to increased pressures from its trading partners, as well as 
internal inflationary pressures and assets bubbles in its housing and stock markets. 
However, its currency is still considered undervalued by most measures. 
 
 
Figure 4. 
Daily renminbi (RMB) rate since 19813 
 
6. Empirical review of China’s monetary policy 
For monetary policy to be effective, the central bank needs independence in its 
actions. Its current monetary policy is discretionary and its tools are dependent on 
economic conditions, having a high and sustainable growth rate, with a managed 
exchange rate and some capital control, especially to prevent capital outflow. It 
does not have an inflation target, and is currently not a major concern for the PBC 
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as its annual inflation rate have been relatively low and stable in recent years 
(Figure 1 and 2). 
Aside from the obvious recommendation to let interest rates and exchange rate 
be more market-driven, China needs to reform its financial system so monetary 
policy implementations can have proper transmission mechanisms. Goodfriend & 
Prasad (2006) recommend the PBC to implement a low inflation objective as the 
nominal anchor, with the view that stabilizing inflation and employment again 
macroeconomic shocks as the most reliable policy method. The authors do not 
advocate a full-fledged inflation targeting regime for China giving that its economy 
is undergoing major structural and financial changes, instead they advocate a more 
modest set of reforms such as further interest rate and currency liberalizations that 
would allow for market driven mechanisms to function, and provide PBC a 
credible nominal anchor of inflation target. 
Ping & Xiong (2003) find that Taylor rule can be a suitable benchmark for 
measuring the stance of China’s monetary policy. They show that China’s 
monetary policy is currently an unstable regime inconsistent with the Taylor Rule. 
Going forward, they recommend for the country to implement further interest rate 
reforms and have the interest rate of money market as the intermediate target for 
the PBC. 
Guo & Ma (2016) find that China’s nominal interest rate does not respond 
adequately to inflation, while very responsive to the output gap. Going forward, the 
authors recommend for the PBC to let interest rate be more flexible to changes in 
inflation. 
Chen, et al., (2016) develop a framework grounded with institutional elements 
to approximate China’s monetary policy in practice. They find strong evidence 
showing that monetary policy is designed to support the central government’s 
mandate of real GDP growth. Additionally, their findings strongly support 
consensus of M2 growth rate as the primary policy tool of the PBC, and bank 
lending channel as an important monetary transmission mechanism. 
There is no consensus in literature on whether the Taylor Rule is suitable for 
China’s transition economy, or whether having an interest rate target or inflation 
target is a more suitable and consistent tool for the PBC, while agreeing on the 
recommendation of further interest rate and financial market reforms for the 
country. 
 
7. Conclusion 
A review of China’s recent monetary policy, particularly since economic reform 
started in 1978, revealed the Chinese government’s need for stability and 
sustainable economic growth. While the government’s stance of the fixed exchange 
rate system is misguided, its intent is clear– it will deploy as many tools as it can in 
order to achieve its macroeconomic goals internally and internationally. Together 
with the fixed exchange rate regime, its monetary tools of controlling interest rate, 
targeting the money supply, and reserve ratio seem to be guiding the developing 
and growing economy into prosperity for its households, while steering it safely 
during the most recent financial crisis. Going forward, in order for monetary policy 
to be more effective as a tool to manage its economy, the Chinese central bank 
should loosen its control on interest rates and exchange rates so as to let borrowing 
costs better reflect their market conditions.  
Additionally, China’s banking system needs to be more privatized so that it can 
conduct effective monetary policy to achieve its macroeconomic goals. 
Recommendations to the PBC going forward are for it to implement further 
financial reforms towards a more market-oriented system. For instance, by 
expanding its capital markets to more participants, including foreign entities; 
increasing exchange rate flexibility and the convertibility of its currency. On the 
monetary policy front, instead of placing its primary focus on high growth rate, it 
should also keep track of the stability of inflation and unemployment issues, as its 
growth rate slows down to a more moderate pace. Furthermore, in the long run, its 
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monetary policy should consider following Taylor Rule to adjust its nominal 
interest rate instead of having an unstable, discretionary monetary policy regime. 
This can pave way for a more independent central bank and monetary policy that 
does not rely on a specific regime. However, this cannot be accomplished without 
further liberalization of interest rates and financial markets. 
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